"Daniel Kearney's Law"; establishes criminal penalties for driving in violation of probationary driver's license restrictions in certain circumstances.

S3701

SENATE, No. 3701

STATE OF NEW JERSEY

222nd LEGISLATURE

�

INTRODUCED FEBRUARY 24, 2026

Sponsored by:

Senator� ANTHONY M. BUCCO

District 25 (Morris and Passaic)

SYNOPSIS

���� �Daniel Kearney�s Law�; establishes criminal
penalties for driving in violation of probationary driver�s license
restrictions in certain circumstances.

CURRENT VERSION OF TEXT

���� As introduced.

��

An Act
concerning criminal penalties for driving in violation
of the probationary driver�s license restrictions, designated as Daniel
Kearney�s Law, and amending N.J.S.2C:11-5 and N.J.S.2C:12-1.

����
Be It
Enacted
by the Senate and General Assembly of
the State of New Jersey:

����� 1.�� N.J.S.2C:11-5 is amended
to read as follows:

���� 2C:11-5.��� Death by auto or
vessel.

���� a.���� Criminal homicide
constitutes reckless vehicular homicide when it is caused by driving a vehicle
or vessel recklessly.

���� Proof that the defendant fell
asleep while driving or was driving after having been without sleep for a
period in excess of 24 consecutive hours may give rise to an inference that the
defendant was driving recklessly.� Proof that the defendant was driving while
intoxicated in violation of R.S.39:4-50 or was operating a vessel under the
influence of alcohol or drugs in violation of section 3 of P.L.1952, c.157
(C.12:7-46) shall give rise to an inference that the defendant was driving
recklessly. Proof that the defendant was operating a hand-held wireless
telephone while driving a motor vehicle in violation of section 1 of P.L.2003,
c.310 (C.39:4-97.3) may give rise to an inference that the defendant was
driving recklessly.
Proof
that the
defendant failed to maintain a lane in violation of

R.S.39:4-88 may give rise to an inference that the defendant was
driving recklessly.� Nothing in this section shall be construed to in any way
limit the conduct or conditions that may be found to constitute driving a
vehicle or vessel recklessly.

���� b.��� Except as provided in
paragraphs
(3) and (5) of this subsection,
reckless vehicular homicide is a crime of the second degree.

���� (1)�� If the defendant was
operating the auto or vessel while under the influence of any intoxicating
liquor, narcotic, hallucinogenic or habit-producing drug, or with a blood
alcohol concentration at or above the prohibited level as prescribed in
R.S.39:4-50, or if the defendant was operating the auto or vessel while his
driver's license or reciprocity privilege was suspended or revoked for any
violation of R.S.39:4-50, section 2 of P.L.1981, c.512 (C.39:4-50.4a), by the
Chief Administrator of the New Jersey Motor Vehicle Commission pursuant to
P.L.1982, c.85 (C.39:5-30a et seq.), or by the court for a violation of
R.S.39:4-96, the defendant shall be sentenced to a term of imprisonment by the
court.� The term of imprisonment shall include the imposition of a minimum
term.� The minimum term shall be fixed at, or between, one-third and one-half
of the sentence imposed by the court or three years, whichever is greater,
during which the defendant shall be ineligible for parole.

���� (2)�� The court shall not
impose a mandatory sentence pursuant to paragraph (1) of this subsection unless
the grounds therefor have been established at a hearing.� At the hearing, which
may occur at the time of sentencing, the prosecutor shall establish by a preponderance
of the evidence that the defendant was operating the auto or vessel while under
the influence of any intoxicating liquor, narcotic, hallucinogenic or
habit-producing drug, or with a blood alcohol concentration at or above the
level prescribed in R.S.39:4-50 or that the defendant was operating the auto or
vessel while his driver's license or reciprocity privilege was suspended or
revoked for any violation of R.S.39:4-50, section 2 of P.L.1981, c.512
(C.39:4-50.4a), by the Chief Administrator of the New Jersey Motor Vehicle
Commission pursuant to P.L.1982, c.85 (C.39:5-30a et seq.), or by the court for
a violation of R.S.39:4-96.� In making its findings, the court shall take
judicial notice of any evidence, testimony or information adduced at the trial,
plea hearing, or other court proceedings and shall also consider the
presentence report and any other relevant information.

���� (3)�� Reckless vehicular
homicide is a crime of the first degree if the defendant was operating the auto
or vessel while in violation of R.S.39:4-50 or section 2 of P.L.1981, c.512
(C.39:4-50.4a) while:

���� (a)�� on any school property
used for school purposes which is owned by or leased to any elementary or
secondary school or school board, or within 1,000 feet of such school property;

���� (b)�� driving through a school
crossing as defined in R.S.39:1-1 if the municipality, by ordinance or
resolution, has designated the school crossing as such; or

���� (c)�� driving through a school
crossing as defined in R.S.39:1-1 knowing that juveniles are present if the
municipality has not designated the school crossing as such by ordinance or
resolution.

���� A map or true copy of a map
depicting the location and boundaries of the area on or within 1,000 feet of
any property used for school purposes which is owned by or leased to any
elementary or secondary school or school board produced pursuant to section 1
of P.L.1987, c.101 (C.2C:35-7) may be used in a prosecution under subparagraph
(a) of this paragraph.

���� It shall be no defense to a
prosecution for a violation of subparagraph (a) or (b) of this paragraph that
the defendant was unaware that the prohibited conduct took place while on or
within 1,000 feet of any school property or while driving through a school
crossing. Nor shall it be a defense to a prosecution under subparagraph (a) or
(b) of this paragraph that no juveniles were present on the school property or
crossing zone at the time of the offense or that the school was not in session.

���� (4)�� If the defendant was
operating the auto or vessel in violation of R.S.39:4-50 or section 2 of
P.L.1981, c.512 (C.39:4-50.4a), the defendant's license to operate a motor
vehicle shall be suspended for a period of between five years and life, which
period shall commence upon completion of any prison sentence imposed upon that
person.

���� (5)��
Reckless
[
Vehicular
]

vehicular
homicide is a crime of the third degree if the defendant
proves by a preponderance of the evidence that the
defendant did not commit any conduct constituting driving a vehicle or vessel
recklessly other than failing
to maintain a lane in violation of
R.S.39:4-88
.

���� c.���� For good cause shown,
the court may, in accepting a plea of guilty under this section, order that
such plea not be evidential in any civil proceeding.

���� d.��� Nothing herein shall be
deemed to preclude, if the evidence so warrants, an indictment and conviction
for aggravated manslaughter under the provisions of subsection a. of
N.J.S.2C:11-4.

���� As used in this section,
"auto or vessel" means all means of conveyance propelled otherwise
than by muscular power.

���� e.���� Any person who violates
paragraph (3) of subsection b. of this section shall forfeit the auto or vessel
used in the commission of the offense, unless the defendant can establish at a
hearing, which may occur at the time of sentencing, by a preponderance of the
evidence that such forfeiture would constitute a serious hardship to the family
of the defendant that outweighs the need to deter such conduct by the defendant
and others. In making its findings, the court shall take judicial notice of any
evidence, testimony
,
or information
adduced at the trial, plea hearing, or other court proceedings and shall also
consider the presentence report and any other relevant information.� Forfeiture
pursuant to this subsection shall be in addition to, and not in lieu of, civil
forfeiture pursuant to chapter 64 of this
Title
.

����
f. A person commits
vehicular homicide if the person is determined to be at fault for a motor
vehicle accident that occurs while the person is driving a vehicle in violation
of section 4 of P.L.1950, c.127 (C.39:3-13.4) and the motor vehicle accident causes
the death of another. Vehicular homicide committed in violation of this
subsection is a crime of the second degree.

(cf: P.L.2017, c.372, s.1)

���� 2.��� N.J.S.2C:12-1 is amended
to read as follows:

���� 2C:12-1.� Assault. a.� Simple
assault.� A person is guilty of assault if the person:

���� (1)�� Attempts to cause or
purposely, knowingly or recklessly causes bodily injury to another; or

���� (2)�� Negligently causes
bodily injury to another with a deadly weapon; or

���� (3)�� Attempts by physical
menace to put another in fear of imminent serious bodily injury.

���� Simple assault is a disorderly
persons offense unless committed in a fight or scuffle entered into by mutual
consent, in which case it is a petty disorderly persons offense.

���� b.��� Aggravated assault.� A
person is guilty of aggravated assault if the person:

���� (1)�� Attempts to cause
serious bodily injury to another, or causes injury purposely or knowingly or
under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life
recklessly causes such injury; or

���� (2)�� Attempts to cause or
purposely or knowingly causes bodily injury to another with a deadly weapon; or

���� (3)�� Recklessly causes bodily
injury to another with a deadly weapon; or

���� (4)�� Knowingly under
circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life
points a firearm, as defined in subsection f. of N.J.S.2C:39-1, at or in the
direction of another, whether or not the actor believes it to be loaded; or

���� (5)�� Commits a simple assault
as defined in paragraph (1), (2), or (3) of subsection a. of this section upon:

���� (a)�� Any law enforcement
officer acting in the performance of the officer's duties while in uniform or
exhibiting evidence of authority or because of the officer's status as a law
enforcement officer; or

���� (b)�� Any paid or volunteer
firefighter acting in the performance of the firefighter's duties while in
uniform or otherwise clearly identifiable as being engaged in the performance
of the duties of a firefighter; or

���� (c)�� Any person engaged in
emergency first-aid or medical services acting in the performance of the
person's duties while in uniform or otherwise clearly identifiable as being
engaged in the performance of emergency first-aid or medical services; or

���� (d)�� Any school board member,
school administrator, teacher, school bus driver, or other employee of a public
or nonpublic school or school board while clearly identifiable as being engaged
in the performance of the person's duties or because of the person's status as
a member or employee of a public or nonpublic school or school board or any
school bus driver employed by an operator under contract to a public or
nonpublic school or school board while clearly identifiable as being engaged in
the performance of the person's duties or because of the person's status as a
school bus driver; or

���� (e)�� Any employee of the
Division of Child Protection and Permanency while clearly identifiable as being
engaged in the performance of the employee's duties or because of the status as
an employee of the division; or

���� (f)�� Any justice of the
Supreme Court, judge of the Superior Court, judge of the Tax Court or municipal
judge while clearly identifiable as being engaged in the performance of
judicial duties or because of the status as a member of the judiciary; or

���� (g)�� Any operator of a
motorbus or the operator's supervisor or any employee of a rail passenger
service while clearly identifiable as being engaged in the performance of the
person's duties or because of the status as an operator of a motorbus or as the
operator's supervisor or as an employee of a rail passenger service; or

���� (h)�� Any Department of
Corrections employee, county correctional police officer, juvenile correctional
police officer, State juvenile facility employee, juvenile detention staff
member, juvenile detention officer, probation officer or any sheriff,
undersheriff, or sheriff's officer acting in the performance of the person's
duties while in uniform or exhibiting evidence of the person's authority or
because of the status as a Department of Corrections employee, county
correctional police officer, juvenile correctional police officer, State
juvenile facility employee, juvenile detention staff member, juvenile detention
officer, probation officer, sheriff, undersheriff, or sheriff's officer; or

���� (i)��� Any employee, including
any person employed under contract, of a utility company as defined in section
2 of P.L.1971, c.224 (C.2A:42-86) or a cable television company subject to the
provisions of the "Cable Television Act," P.L.1972, c.186 (C.48:5A-1
et seq.) while clearly identifiable as being engaged in the performance of the
employee's duties in regard to connecting, disconnecting, or repairing or
attempting to connect, disconnect, or repair any gas, electric, or water
utility, or cable television or telecommunication service; or

���� (j)��� Any health care worker
employed by a licensed health care facility to provide direct patient care, any
health care professional licensed or otherwise authorized pursuant to Title 26
or Title 45 of the Revised Statutes to practice a health care profession,
except a direct care worker at a State or county psychiatric hospital or State
developmental center or veterans' memorial home, while clearly identifiable as
being engaged in the duties of providing direct patient care or practicing the
health care profession; or

���� (k)�� Any direct care worker
at a State or county psychiatric hospital or State developmental center or
veterans' memorial home, while clearly identifiable as being engaged in the
duties of providing direct patient care or practicing the health care
profession, provided that the actor is not a patient or resident at the
facility who is classified by the facility as having a mental illness or
developmental disability; or

���� (l)��� Any employee of a store
or other retail mercantile establishment while clearly identifiable as being
engaged in the performance of the person's duties.� "Store or other retail
mercantile establishment" means the same as such term is defined in N.J.S.2C:20-11.�
"Employee" means any person who provides customer assistance, store
management, visual merchandising, loss prevention or security services, whether
in uniform or in plain clothes, or who acts as a cashier, salesperson, or team associate
or otherwise interacts with customers for or on behalf of the store or other
retail mercantile establishment; or

���� (6)�� Causes bodily injury to
another person while fleeing or attempting to elude a law enforcement officer
in violation of subsection b. of N.J.S.2C:29-2 or while operating a motor
vehicle in violation of subsection c. of N.J.S.2C:20-10.� Notwithstanding any other
provision of law to the contrary, a person shall be strictly liable for a
violation of this paragraph upon proof of a violation of subsection b. of
N.J.S.2C:29-2 or while operating a motor vehicle in violation of subsection c.
of N.J.S.2C:20-10 which resulted in bodily injury to another person; or

���� (7)�� Attempts to cause
significant bodily injury to another or causes significant bodily injury
purposely or knowingly or, under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference
to the value of human life recklessly causes such significant bodily injury; or

���� (8)�� Causes bodily injury by
knowingly or purposely starting a fire or causing an explosion in violation of
N.J.S.2C:17-1 which results in bodily injury to any emergency services
personnel involved in fire suppression activities, rendering emergency medical
services resulting from the fire or explosion or rescue operations, or
rendering any necessary assistance at the scene of the fire or explosion,
including any bodily injury sustained while responding to the scene of a
reported fire or explosion.� For purposes of this paragraph, "emergency
services personnel" shall include, but not be limited to, any paid or
volunteer firefighter, any person engaged in emergency first-aid or medical
services and any law enforcement officer.� Notwithstanding any other provision
of law to the contrary, a person shall be strictly liable for a violation of
this paragraph upon proof of a violation of N.J.S.2C:17-1 which resulted in
bodily injury to any emergency services personnel; or

���� (9)�� Knowingly, under
circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life,
points or displays a firearm, as defined in subsection f. of N.J.S.2C:39-1, at
or in the direction of a law enforcement officer; or

���� (10) Knowingly points,
displays or uses an imitation firearm, as defined in subsection v. of
N.J.S.2C:39-1, at or in the direction of a law enforcement officer with the
purpose to intimidate, threaten, or attempt to put the officer in fear of
bodily injury or for any unlawful purpose; or

���� (11)� Uses or activates a
laser sighting system or device, or a system or device which, in the manner
used, would cause a reasonable person to believe that it is a laser sighting
system or device, against a law enforcement officer acting in the performance
of the officer's duties while in uniform or exhibiting evidence of the
officer's authority.� As used in this paragraph, "laser sighting system or
device" means any system or device that is integrated with or affixed to a
firearm and emits a laser light beam that is used to assist in the sight
alignment or aiming of the firearm; or

���� (12)� Attempts to cause
significant bodily injury or causes significant bodily injury purposely or
knowingly or, under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value
of human life, recklessly causes significant bodily injury to a person who,
with respect to the actor, meets the definition of a victim of domestic
violence, as defined in subsection d. of section 3 of P.L.1991, c.261
(C.2C:25-19); or

���� (13)� Knowingly or, under
circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life,
recklessly obstructs the breathing or blood circulation of a person who, with
respect to the actor, meets the definition of a victim of domestic violence, as
defined in subsection d. of section 3 of P.L.1991, c.261 (C.2C:25-19), by
applying pressure on the throat or neck or blocking the nose or mouth of such
person, thereby causing or attempting to cause bodily injury.

���� Aggravated assault under
paragraphs (1) and (6) of subsection b. of this section is a crime of the
second degree; under paragraphs (2), (7), (9), and (10) of subsection b. of
this section is a crime of the third degree; under paragraphs (3) and (4) of subsection
b. of this section is a crime of the fourth degree; and under paragraph (5) of
subsection b. of this section is a crime of the third degree if the victim
suffers bodily injury, otherwise it is a crime of the fourth degree, except:

���� any aggravated assault under
subparagraph (g) of paragraph (5) of subsection b. of this section shall be a
crime of the third degree; and

���� any aggravated assault of a
law enforcement officer under subparagraph (a) of paragraph (5) of subsection
b. of this section resulting in serious bodily injury shall be a crime of the
second degree. Notwithstanding the provisions of N.J.S.2C:1-8 or any other law,
a conviction for assaulting a law enforcement officer under subparagraph (a) of
paragraph (5) of subsection b. of this section shall not merge with a
conviction for any other criminal offense.� A mandatory term of incarceration
pursuant to section 2 of P.L.1997, c.117 (C.2C:43-7.2) shall not apply to a
conviction for aggravated assault of a law enforcement officer under
subparagraph (a) of paragraph (5) of subsection b. of this section unless the
assault resulted in serious bodily injury to the officer. A person charged with
aggravated assault of a law enforcement officer under subparagraph (a) of
paragraph (5) of subsection b. of this section resulting in serious bodily
injury shall be ineligible to apply for admission to a program of supervisory treatment
pursuant to the provisions of N.J.S.2C:43-12 through 2C:43-22.

���� Aggravated assault under
paragraph (8) of subsection b. of this section is a crime of the third degree
if the victim suffers bodily injury; if the victim suffers significant bodily
injury or serious bodily injury it is a crime of the second degree.� Aggravated
assault under paragraph (11) of subsection b. of this section is a crime of the
third degree.� Aggravated assault under paragraph (12) of subsection b. of this
section is a crime of the third degree but the presumption of non-imprisonment
set forth in subsection e. of N.J.S.2C:44-1 for a first offense of a crime of
the third degree shall not apply.� Aggravated assault under paragraph (13) of
subsection b. of this section is a crime of the second degree.�

���� c. (1)
[
A
]

Except as
provided in paragraph (5) of this subsection, a
person is guilty of assault
by auto or vessel when the person drives a vehicle or vessel recklessly and
causes either serious bodily injury or bodily injury to another.� Assault by
auto or vessel is a crime of the fourth degree if serious bodily injury results
and is a disorderly persons offense if bodily injury results. Proof that the
defendant was operating a hand-held wireless telephone while driving a motor
vehicle in violation of section 1 of P.L.2003, c.310 (C.39:4-97.3) may give
rise to an inference that the defendant was driving recklessly.�

���� (2)�� Assault by auto or
vessel is a crime of the third degree if the person drives the vehicle while in
violation of R.S.39:4-50 or section 2 of P.L.1981, c.512 (C.39:4-50.4a) and
serious bodily injury results and is a crime of the fourth degree if the person
drives the vehicle while in violation of R.S.39:4-50 or section 2 of P.L.1981,
c.512 (C.39:4-50.4a) and bodily injury results.�

���� (3)�� Assault by auto or
vessel is a crime of the second degree if serious bodily injury results from
the defendant operating the auto or vessel while in violation of R.S.39:4-50 or
section 2 of P.L.1981, c.512 (C.39:4-50.4a) while:

���� (a)�� on any school property
used for school purposes which is owned by or leased to any elementary or
secondary school or school board, or within 1,000 feet of such school property;

���� (b)�� driving through a school
crossing as defined in R.S.39:1-1 if the municipality, by ordinance or
resolution, has designated the school crossing as such; or

���� (c)�� driving through a school
crossing as defined in R.S.39:1-1 knowing that juveniles are present if the
municipality has not designated the school crossing as such by ordinance or
resolution.�

���� Assault by auto or vessel is a
crime of the third degree if bodily injury results from the defendant operating
the auto or vessel in violation of this paragraph.

���� A map or true copy of a map
depicting the location and boundaries of the area on or within 1,000 feet of
any property used for school purposes which is owned by or leased to any
elementary or secondary school or school board produced pursuant to section 1
of P.L.1987, c.101 (C.2C:35-7) may be used in a prosecution under subparagraph
(a) of paragraph (3) of this subsection.

���� It shall be no defense to a
prosecution for a violation of subparagraph (a) or (b) of paragraph (3) of this
subsection that the defendant was unaware that the prohibited conduct took
place while on or within 1,000 feet of any school property or while driving
through a school crossing.� Nor shall it be a defense to a prosecution under
subparagraph (a) or (b) of paragraph (3) of this subsection that no juveniles
were present on the school property or crossing zone at the time of the offense
or that the school was not in session.�

���� (4)�� Assault by auto or
vessel is a crime of the third degree if the person purposely drives a vehicle
in an aggressive manner directed at another vehicle and serious bodily injury
results and is a crime of the fourth degree if the person purposely drives a vehicle
in an aggressive manner directed at another vehicle and bodily injury results.�
For purposes of this paragraph, "driving a vehicle in an aggressive
manner" shall include, but is not limited to, unexpectedly altering the
speed of the vehicle, making improper or erratic traffic lane changes,
disregarding traffic control devices, failing to yield the right of way, or
following another vehicle too closely.

����
(5) A person is guilty of
assault by auto when the person is determined to be at fault for a motor
vehicle accident that occurred while the person was driving a vehicle in
violation of section 4 of P.L.1950, c.127 (C.39:3-13.4) and the motor vehicle
accident caused bodily injury or serious bodily injury to another. Assault by
auto is a crime of the fourth degree if serious bodily injury results and a
disorderly persons offense if bodily injury results.

���� As used in this subsection,
"vessel" means a means of conveyance for travel on water and
propelled otherwise than by muscular power.

���� d.��� A person who is employed
by a facility as defined in section 2 of P.L.1977, c.239 (C.52:27G-2) who
commits a simple assault as defined in paragraph (1) or (2) of subsection a. of
this section upon an institutionalized elderly person as defined in section 2
of P.L.1977, c.239 (C.52:27G-2) is guilty of a crime of the fourth degree.

���� e.���� (Deleted by amendment,
P.L.2001, c.443)

���� f.���� A person who commits a
simple assault as defined in paragraph (1), (2), or (3) of subsection a. of
this section in the presence of a child under 16 years of age at a school or
community sponsored youth sports event is guilty of a crime of the fourth degree.�
The defendant shall be strictly liable upon proof that the offense occurred, in
fact, in the presence of a child under 16 years of age.� It shall not be a
defense that the defendant did not know that the child was present or
reasonably believed that the child was 16 years of age or older.� The
provisions of this subsection shall not be construed to create any liability on
the part of a participant in a youth sports event or to abrogate any immunity
or defense available to a participant in a youth sports event.� As used in this
act, "school or community sponsored youth sports event" means a
competition, practice, or instructional event involving one or more
interscholastic sports teams or youth sports teams organized pursuant to a
nonprofit or similar charter or which are member teams in a youth league
organized by or affiliated with a county or municipal recreation department and
shall not include collegiate, semi-professional or professional sporting
events.

(cf: P.L.2025, c.39, s.3)

���� 3.��� This act shall take
effect on the first day of the fourth month next following the date of
enactment.

STATEMENT

���� This bill establishes criminal
penalties for driving in violation of the State�s probationary driver�s license
restrictions in certain circumstances involving death, serious bodily injury,
and bodily injury.

���� Under the provisions of the
bill, a person is guilty of vehicular homicide if the person is determined to
be at fault for a motor vehicle accident that occurs while the person is
driving a vehicle in violation of the probationary driver�s license
restrictions and the motor vehicle accident causes the death of another.
Vehicular homicide committed in violation of the bill is a crime of the second
degree. Additionally, the bill provides that a person is guilty of assault by
auto if the person is determined to be at fault for a motor vehicle accident
that occurs while the person is driving a vehicle in violation of the State
probationary driver�s license restrictions and the motor vehicle accident causes
bodily injury or serious bodily injury to another. Under the bill, assault by
auto is a crime of the fourth degree if serious bodily injury results and a
disorderly persons offense if bodily injury results.

���� Under current law, a driver
with a probationary driver�s license who is under the age of 21 is restricted
from driving with more than one passenger, unless accompanied by a parent or
guardian, and driving between the hours of 11:01 p.m. and 5:00 a.m., with
certain exceptions.

���� The bill is designated as
�Daniel Kearney�s Law� in honor of Daniel Kearney, a 19-year-old resident of
West Milford, New Jersey who tragically died as a passenger in a single vehicle
motor vehicle accident on September 3, 2021. The operator of the vehicle was
under 21, driving with a probationary driver�s license, and had two passengers
in the vehicle at the time of accident.