Clarifies sentencing under certain circumstances.

S4406

SENATE, No. 4406

STATE OF NEW JERSEY

222nd LEGISLATURE

�

INTRODUCED JUNE 4, 2026

Sponsored by:

Senator� ANGELA V. MCKNIGHT

District 31 (Hudson)

Senator� PATRICK J. DIEGNAN, JR.

District 18 (Middlesex)

Assemblywoman� ELIANA PINTOR MARIN

District 29 (Essex and Hudson)

Assemblywoman� YVONNE LOPEZ

District 19 (Middlesex)

Assemblywoman� ANNETTE QUIJANO

District 20 (Union)

Co-Sponsored by:

Senators Timberlake and Wimberly

SYNOPSIS

���� Clarifies sentencing under certain circumstances.

CURRENT VERSION OF TEXT

���� As introduced.

��

An Act
concerning sentencing for convictions of certain crimes
and amending N.J.S.2C:44-1.

����
Be It
Enacted
by the Senate and General Assembly of
the State of New Jersey:

���� 1. N.J.S.2C:44-1 is amended to
read as follows:

���� 2C:44-1. a. In determining the
appropriate sentence to be imposed on a person who has been convicted of an
offense, the court shall consider the following aggravating circumstances:

���� (1) The nature and
circumstances of the offense, and the role of the actor in committing the
offense, including whether or not it was committed in an especially heinous,
cruel, or depraved manner;

���� (2) The gravity and
seriousness of harm inflicted on the victim, including whether or not the
defendant knew or reasonably should have known that the victim of the offense
was particularly vulnerable or incapable of resistance due to advanced age,
ill-health, or extreme youth, or was for any other reason substantially
incapable of exercising normal physical or mental power of resistance;

���� (3) The risk that the
defendant will commit another offense;

���� (4) A lesser sentence will
depreciate the seriousness of the defendant�s offense because it involved a
breach of the public trust under chapters 27 and 30 of this title, or the
defendant took advantage of a position of trust or confidence to commit the offense;

���� (5) There is a substantial
likelihood that the defendant is involved in organized criminal activity;

���� (6) The extent of the
defendant�s prior criminal record and the seriousness of the offenses of which
the defendant has been convicted;

���� (7) The defendant committed
the offense pursuant to an agreement to either pay or be paid for the
commission of the offense and the pecuniary incentive was beyond that inherent
in the offense itself;

���� (8) The defendant committed
the offense against a police or other law enforcement officer, correctional
employee or firefighter, acting in the performance of the officer, employee, or
firefighter duties while in uniform or exhibiting evidence of his authority;
the defendant committed the offense because of the status of the victim as a
public servant; the defendant committed the offense against a sports official,
athletic coach or manager, acting in or immediately following the performance
of the person�s duties or because of the person�s status as a sports official,
coach or manager; or the defendant committed the offense against any health
care professional, volunteer working for a health care professional or working
at a health care facility, supportive services staff member working for a
health care professional or working at a health care facility, or employee of a
health care professional or health care facility, while the health care
professional, volunteer, supportive services staff member, or employee is
performing official duties.

���� For the purposes of this
paragraph, �health care facility� and �health care professional� mean the same
as those terms are defined in subsection b. of section 3 of P.L.2023, c.48
(C.2C:12-3.1);

���� (9) The need for deterring the
defendant and others from violating the law;

���� (10) The offense involved
fraudulent or deceptive practices committed against any department or division
of State government;

���� (11) The imposition of a fine,
penalty, or order of restitution without also imposing a term of imprisonment
would be perceived by the defendant or others merely as part of the cost of
doing business, or as an acceptable contingent business or operating expense
associated with the initial decision to resort to unlawful practices;

���� (12) The defendant committed
the offense against a person who the defendant knew or should have known was 60
years of age or older, or disabled;

���� (13) The defendant, while in
the course of committing or attempting to commit the crime, including the
immediate flight therefrom, used or was in possession of a stolen motor
vehicle;

���� (14) The offense involved an
act of domestic violence, as that term is defined in subsection a. of section 3
of P.L.1991, c.261 (C.2C:25-19), committed in the presence of a child under 16
years of age; and

���� (15) The offense involved an
act of domestic violence, as that term is defined in subsection a. of section 3
of P.L.1991, c.261 (C.2C:25-19) and the defendant committed at least one act of
domestic violence on more than one occasion.

���� b.��� In determining the
appropriate sentence to be imposed on a person who has been convicted of an
offense, the court may properly consider the following mitigating
circumstances:

���� (1) The defendant�s conduct
neither caused nor threatened serious harm;

���� (2) The defendant did not
contemplate that the defendant�s conduct would cause or threaten serious harm;

���� (3) The defendant acted under
a strong provocation;

���� (4) There were substantial
grounds tending to excuse or justify the defendant�s conduct, though failing to
establish a defense;

���� (5) The victim of the
defendant�s conduct induced or facilitated its commission;

���� (6) The defendant has
compensated or will compensate the victim of the defendant�s conduct for the
damage or injury that the victim sustained, or will participate in a program of
community service;

���� (7) The defendant has no
history of prior delinquency or criminal activity or has led a law-abiding life
for a substantial period of time before the commission of the present offense;

���� (8) The defendant�s conduct
was the result of circumstances unlikely to recur;

���� (9) The character and attitude
of the defendant indicate that the defendant is unlikely to commit another
offense;

���� (10) The defendant is
particularly likely to respond affirmatively to probationary treatment;

���� (11) The imprisonment of the
defendant would entail excessive hardship to the defendant or the defendant�s
dependents;

���� (12) The willingness of the
defendant to cooperate with law enforcement authorities;

���� (13) The conduct of a youthful
defendant was substantially influenced by another person more mature than the
defendant;

���� (14) The defendant was under
26 years of age at the time of the commission of the offense; and

���� (15) For an offense other than
murder or a crime for which the defendant would be required to register as a
sex offender pursuant to section 2 of P.L.1994, c.133 (C.2C:7-2), whether the
defendant�s status as a victim of domestic violence as that term is defined in
subsection a. of section 3 of P.L.1991, c.261 (C.2C:25-19), or other evidence
that the defendant was otherwise subjected to substantial physical, sexual, or
psychological abuse, and the domestic violence or abuse was a contributing
factor to the defendant�s conviction.� The court may find that this factor
applies regardless of whether the defendant raised a defense that included the
abuse.� In addition to any other evidence the court deems appropriate in
determining whether this factor applies, the court shall consider all relevant
circumstances, and shall take judicial notice of any evidence, testimony, or
information adduced at the trial, plea hearing, or other court proceedings.

���� c. (1) A plea of guilty by a
defendant or failure to so plead shall not be considered in withholding or
imposing a sentence of imprisonment.

���� (2) When imposing a sentence
of imprisonment the court shall consider the defendant�s eligibility for
release under the law governing parole, including time credits awarded pursuant
to Title 30 of the Revised Statutes, in determining the appropriate term of
imprisonment.

���� d.��� Presumption of
imprisonment. �
(1)
The court shall deal with a person who has been
convicted of a crime of the first or second degree, or a crime of the third
degree where the court finds that the aggravating factor in paragraph (5),
(14), or (15) of subsection a. of this section applies, by imposing a sentence
of imprisonment unless, having regard to the character and condition of the
defendant, it is of the opinion that the defendant�s imprisonment would be a
serious injustice which overrides the need to deter such conduct by others.�
Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection e. of this section, the court
shall deal with a person who has been convicted of theft of a motor vehicle or
of the unlawful taking of a motor vehicle and who has previously been convicted
of either offense by imposing a sentence of imprisonment unless, having regard
to the character and condition of the defendant, it is of the opinion that
imprisonment would be a serious injustice which overrides the need to deter
such conduct by others. �This
[
subsection
]

paragraph

shall not apply to a person for whom the court finds that the mitigating factor
in paragraph (15) of subsection b. of this section applies.

����
(2)� In cases of
convictions for crimes of the first or second degree where the court is clearly
convinced that the mitigating factors substantially outweigh the aggravating
factors and where the interest of justice demands, the court may sentence the
defendant to a term appropriate to a crime of one degree lower than that of the
crime for which the defendant was convicted.� If the court does impose a sentence
pursuant to this paragraph, or if the court imposes a noncustodial or
probationary sentence upon conviction for a crime of the first or second
degree, the sentence shall not become final for 10 days in order to permit the
appeal of the sentence by the prosecution.

���� e.��� The court shall deal
with a person convicted of an offense other than a crime of the first or second
degree, who has not previously been convicted of an offense, without imposing a
sentence of imprisonment unless, having regard to the nature and circumstances
of the offense and the history, character, and condition of the defendant, it
is of the opinion that imprisonment is necessary for the protection of the
public under the criteria set forth in subsection a. of this section, except
that this subsection shall not apply if the court finds that the aggravating
factor in paragraph (5), (14) or (15) of subsection a. of this section applies
or if the person is convicted of any of the following crimes of the third
degree: theft of a motor vehicle; unlawful taking of a motor vehicle; eluding;
strict liability vehicular homicide pursuant to section 1 of P.L.2017, c.165
(C.2C:11-5.3); if the person is convicted of a crime of the third degree
constituting use of a false government document in violation of subsection c.
of section 1 of P.L.1983, c.565 (C.2C:21-2.1); if the person is convicted of a
crime of the third degree constituting distribution, manufacture or possession
of an item containing personal identifying information in violation of
subsection b. of section 6 of P.L.2003, c.184 (C.2C:21-17.3); if the person is
convicted of a crime of the third or fourth degree constituting bias
intimidation in violation of N.J.S.2C:16-1; if the person is convicted of a
crime of the third degree under paragraph (12) of subsection b. of
N.J.S.2C:12-1 or section 2 of P.L.1997, c.111 (C.2C:12-1.1); or if the person
is convicted of a crime of the third or fourth degree under the provisions of
section 1 or 2 of P.L.2007, c.341 (C.2C:33-29 or C.2C:33-30).

���� f.���� (Deleted by amendment,
P.L.2025, c.328)

���� g.��� Imposition of
Noncustodial Sentences in Certain Cases. If the court, in considering the
aggravating factors set forth in subsection a. of this section, finds the
aggravating factor in paragraph (2), (5), (10), or (12) of subsection a. of
this section and does not impose a custodial sentence, the court shall
specifically place on the record the mitigating factors which justify the
imposition of a noncustodial sentence.

���� h.��� Except as provided in
section 2 of P.L.1993, c.123 (C.2C:43-11), the presumption of imprisonment as
provided in subsection d. of this section shall not preclude the admission of a
person to the Intensive Supervision Program, established pursuant to the Rules
Governing the Courts of the State of New Jersey.

���� i.���� Notwithstanding any
provision of N.J.S.2C:43-6 or any other provisions of law to the contrary, in
sentencing a defendant for whom the court finds that the mitigating factor in
paragraph (15) of subsection b. of this section applies, the court may impose sentence
as follows:

����
(a)
for a crime of the first degree, a term of at least five years but not more
than 10 years;

���� (b) for a crime of the second
degree, a term of at least three years but not more than five years;

���� (c) for a crime of the third
degree, a term of not more than 18 months;

���� (d) for a crime of the fourth
degree, a term of not more than six months; and

���� (e)
for a non-indictable offense, a sentence of probation or conditional discharge
.

���� j.���� In determining whether
the mitigating factor in paragraph (15) of subsection b. of this section
applies, the court shall consider all relevant circumstances, and shall take
judicial notice of any evidence, testimony, or information adduced at the
trial, plea hearing, or other court proceedings and any additional relevant
evidence including, but not limited to:

���� (1)
court records;

���� (2)
social services records;

���� (3)
presentencing reports;

���� (4)
hospital records;

���� (5) sworn statements from a
witness of the domestic violence who is not the defendant;

���� (6)
criminal records;

���� (7)
domestic violence incident reports;

���� (8)
protective orders;

���� (9) verification of
consultation with a licensed medical care provider or mental health care
provider;

���� (10) testimony or a sworn
statement from a trained professional staff member of a victim services
organization, an attorney, a member of the clergy, a health care professional,
or other professional from whom the person has sought assistance in addressing
the trauma associated with being a victim, or a victim of any of the underlying
cases for which the defendant is being sentenced;�

���� (11)
Department of Corrections records; and

���� (12)
any other evidence the court deems relevant.

(cf: P.L.2025, c.328, s.1)

���� 2. This act shall take effect
immediately and shall be retroactive to the effective date of section 1 of
P.L.2025, c.328.

STATEMENT

���� This bill clarifies that a
court may sentence a defendant to a reduced sentence under certain
circumstances.

���� Under the bill, in cases of a conviction
for a crime of the first or second degree where the court is clearly convinced
that the mitigating factors substantially outweigh the aggravating factors and
where the interest of justice demands, the court may sentence the defendant to
a term appropriate to a crime of one degree lower than that of the crime for
which the defendant was convicted.� If the court does impose a sentence
pursuant to this provision, or if the court imposes a noncustodial or
probationary sentence upon conviction for a crime of the first or second
degree, the sentence would not become final for 10 days in order to permit the
appeal of the sentence by the prosecution.

���� A crime of the first degree is
punishable by a term of imprisonment of 10 to 20 years, a fine of up to
$200,000, or both.� A crime of the second degree is punishable by a term of
imprisonment of five to 10 years, a fine of up to $150,000, or both.

���� This bill restores language
omitted under P.L.2025, c.328.� The bill would take effect immediately and
apply retroactively to the effective date of section 1 of P.L.2025, c.328.